弗列格是分析哲學之父，但洛克對語言的想法架構了一個理解分析學派在語言哲學上簡單清楚的背景。我們可以說弗列格語言哲學的開端在反對洛克的中心思想。洛克將他對語言的想法呈現在 An Essay concerning Human Understanding :
Man, though have great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his breast, invisible, and hidden from ohters, nor can of themselves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary, that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereby those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose, nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men, as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion, that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use then of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate signification.
以下條列式呈現洛克對語言的概念架構:
(一) 語言的功能定義了語言的本質。
(二) 溝通是語言的(社會性)功能。
(三) 語言溝通在傳達個人的想法(thought)。洛克認為沒有溝通社會的安定繁榮便不在，人便回到霍布斯的自然狀態。
(四) 文字的代表語言所要傳達的想法的組成份子的意義(signify, mean)。
(五) 想法由觀念概念(idea)所構成。
(六) 人的觀念無法被他人所感知到。
(七) 文字與文字所代表的意義之間的連結關係是任意的。
(八) 文字本身本質上並不具有意義
此Blog是中正大學九十九年度第一學期哲學系【史賓諾沙論上帝與心靈】的網路平台，此課程由教育部中綱計畫「經典教學計畫」補助,計畫編號MOE-099-01-02-2-11-2-15 ○授課教授：侯維之老師●上課時間：[星期四]十點十分至十二點○助教：胡映群●上課地點：文學院140室
Locke否認有innate ideas的存在，因為他試圖用這樣的方法來去除宗教的獨斷。在談到Innate ideas時提到了普遍的同意(Universal consent)，是指人對某些原則會有一樣的看法，Universal consent有以下三個特性：
回覆刪除(1)Innate principles是眾人都可接受的。
(2)Universal consent對於「Innate principle來自Innate ideas」應該有清楚的證明。
(3)除了Universal consent以外沒有其他東西能夠證明Innate principle。
以下引文提到Locke對於第二及第三點的反駁。
Human Understanding:
Chapter 1 No Innate Speculative Principles
3. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.
4. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, ‘Whatsoever is, is,’ and ‘It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be’; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.
針對第二點，首先要先說到Locke根本不承認有innate principles的存在。他認為，就算真的有universal agreement，一定也還存在著不需要支持innate principle就可以證明的方法存在。
針對第三點，支持有Innate principle所要表達的是Universal consent這樣一個大家都同益的原則是innate，而Locke所提出的反駁卻是說不可能有任何原則是大家都同意的，所以不可能會有所謂的Universal consent。然而，這樣的反駁其實是無效的，因為他所反駁的是支持有Innate principle的人所提的條件的前鍵，這對於結論是不會有影響的，故於此Locke所反駁的為無效論證，除非Universal consent是唯一的。
Locke是一位經驗主義者，認為知識都是需要仰賴於經驗才能得到，反對有innate ideas的主張，並對於Descartes提出的論點做出反駁和質疑。
回覆刪除引用教材原文：
For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs to be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.
If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing.
No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. (Essay Concerning Human Understanding p.40, 5)
innatists主張人的ideas都是天生的，不須要靠經驗，我們的複雜ideas是由天生的simple ideas建構起來的。而反對者提出某些人，如兒童、或是白癡、智障等人，他們很明顯的不能有某些我們一般人認為理所當然的觀念，也就是innatists主張是天生就有的觀念，如數學等，他們沒有所謂的innate ideas。而innatists回答，孩童和白痴等人只是因為他們還未查覺到銘印在心中innate ideas，不是沒有innate ideas，但他們的心靈有能力去了解。
Locke不滿意的的是，如果照這個說法，那麼所有為真的命題，且心靈有認知能力去察覺他、理解他，我們就可以說這些idea都是在心靈、都是天生的嗎?
這對於innatists來說是一個很難解決的問題
洛克駁斥君權神授的觀念，主張社會契約論、人民有天賦人權（nature right）。洛克的政治思想是美國憲法的理論依據，也是促成法國大革命的原因之一，對後世的政治發展影響非常大。其中，洛克的政治思想裡主張宗教寬容，而且政府不應該限制人民的宗教自由。在A Letter Concerning Toleration裡，洛克說明他如此主張的理由：
回覆刪除First, Because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. Nor can any power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people; because no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true, and the other well-pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. For in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto him, we add unto the number of our other sins, those also of hypocrisy, and contempt of his Divine Majesty.
In the second place. The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.
第一，關心自己的精神生活是每個人自己的事，要打從心裡相信才是真的信仰，別人用外力逼迫是沒用的。第二，政府的權力只是外力，所以政府怎麼限制人民的宗教自由都是徒勞。
此外值得注意的是，洛克有個預設，只要不侵害到其他人，人民要做什麼事都可以。洛克也主張政府可以說服人民接受某個宗教觀點，因為政府只是說服人民，沒有用外力逼迫人民接受，不過說服成不成功就是另一回事了。
Locke認為，人類從他人或自己的想法(thoughts)獲得愉快或利益；且人類透過溝通彼此的想法，建立一個舒適又便利的社會。Locke對想法有兩點詮釋：一、想法存在個人的內心無法被他人察覺；二、想法是由許多概念(ideas)組成的。因此，要使自身的想法被他人了解(也就是溝通)，我們需要找出可以表達概念的方法。一個合適的方法為：使用「文字符號」或者「聲音」來表達概念。
回覆刪除原文引用An Essay concerning Human Understanding :
Man, though have great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his breast, invisible, and hidden from ohters, nor can of themselves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary, that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereby those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose, nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men, as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion, that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use then of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate signification.
我認為Locke的想法是積極的。原因有兩個。一、從Locke認為溝通可以獲得愉快或利益、且建立一個舒適又便利的社會，這兩點可以看出Locke是一個樂觀的人。二、既然Locke知道「概念(或想法)存在個人的內心無法被他人察覺」，那麼對Locke來說，要使概念被溝通，語言僅提供一個可行的方法，而不是實踐溝通的真正方法。
Locke and the Natural Right
回覆刪除在政治方面，洛克是除了積極參與政治活動外，他自己也發展出一套有趣的政治哲學觀。其中一個政治哲學的議題是：人類對於自然物是否擁有財產權，即是，人類有沒有權力擁有大自然的資源。洛克對此持肯定意見，相信人類有對大自然的財產權，並且提出四個論證支持自己的觀點。以下是洛克所提出來的第二個論證，亦稱為勞力混合論證(labour-mixing argument)：
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others. (Second Treatise, s.27, pp.287-8)
勞力混合論證(labour-mixing argument)的大意是：當S的勞力混合了Y，S便有權利擁有Y。換句話說，我擁有我的勞力，並且我有權利擁有混合了我勞力的東西，故當土地混合了我的勞力時，我便有權利擁有土地。
可是，這個論證不能滿足洛克提出論證的目的。
第一，有些人先天手殘、腳殘兼腦殘，無法使用勞力或至多能使用很少的勞力，這個主張對他們獲得財產並不公平，因為這個主張蘊涵某些人會因為先天缺陷而擁有較少──甚麼完全沒有──權利。
第二，諾齊克(Nozick)認為它隱藏了一個前提：如果S有x而且S把x與未被擁有的y混合，則S有權擁有y。但是這個前提並不合理。當我擁有一瓶蕃茄醬，我把我已擁有的蕃茄醬倒進大海，根據洛克的論證，我會因此擁有大海的財產權，然而，這明顯是荒謬的。
Locke主張沒有任何idea是innate，他藉由論證God的idea不是innate來說明這個想法，他認為如果人類具有理性，那麼經由理性第一個發現的idea應該是God，但從經驗上的結果來看，並非如此。因此，沒有idea是innate的。
回覆刪除原文引用An Essay concerning Human Understanding:
Since then though the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it. Since if God hath set any impression, any character, on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of Himself; as far as our week capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.
從這段文本可以理解，Locke從經驗上無法發現有任何idea是innate的，因為從理性上優先應該發現的idea是God，但是人類對God卻無法認知，因此既然God的idea不是innate的，那麼就不會有其他的idea是innate的，所以Locke認為所有的idea都是後天從經驗得來的，並不存在著所謂的innate idea。
林紀存
主題：洛克對於「評判」(judgement)與知識(knowledge)的區分與認知
回覆刪除洛克是一個支持自由主義的哲學家，反對教會的威權與反智主義，在其論文「An Essay concerning Human Understanding」，專門花費了一章節來討論「評判」的概念與及其地位。從該章節中，可以看出洛克將評判能力做為追求知識的必要條件。
洛克首先指出了知識本身的不充足性：「Our knowledge being short, we want something else.」知識本身引導了人類的行為，然而，如果沒有了認知何謂確切知識的手段，人類將不知該如何行動：「man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge.」(取自於John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding，Chapter XIV，Of Judgment，第一段)
(What use to be made of this twilight state. Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight; as he has given us some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things in comparison, probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the greatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probability; suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein, to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might, by every day’s experience, be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error; the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us, to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care, in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection.)(取自於John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding，Chapter XIV，Of Judgment，第二段)
(Judgment, or assent to probability, supplies our want of knowledge. The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment: whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree; or, which is the same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness, or haste, even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had.)(取自於John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding，Chapter XIV，Of Judgment，第三段)
而人並非一開始就對所有知識的具有確切性，雖然洛克認為還是有一些知識是我們確切掌握的。根據洛克的描述，這是一種「黃昏狀態」(twilight state)。
而洛克相信，上帝給了人類一項功能，可以讓他們去追求知識的正確性，那就是「評判」。而當我們不使用評判之能力的時候，不管我們的對任何命題的態度是什麼，都不將有任何的論證。在此套用知識論的用語：該信念沒有任何的證成(Justification)。
而洛克認為，人常常會因為人類的懶惰與忙碌，忽略了對於評判的使用，導致我們對於事件常有著模糊的認知，卻不以為意。
(Judgement is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it. Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood:—
First, KNOWLEDGE, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas.
Secondly JUDGMENT, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it so unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is right judgment.)(取自於John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding，Chapter XIV，Of Judgment，第四段)
最後，洛克下了一個總結：心靈有兩種熟知對與錯功能的事物，其一是知識，其二則是評判。
洛克在知識的定義上似乎與我們現代的知識論大不相同。他將知識定義為藉由感知所獲得，而對於其所掌握的概念的真或假毫不懷疑。
而評判則不使用感知的能力去對待概念，其將概念做結合，或是分解它們，以此方式來掌握概念，而如果這個評判後來又與事實符合，則其也就是一個正確的判斷。
具體一點來說，知識是一種藉由經驗的方式去認知外在世界的功能，而評判本身則可以不依賴於經驗。所以評判所要面對的事件，也可以是對未來預測，而這是「知識」所不能做的事情，因為我們不能感知未來，我們卻可以預測未來。
洛克與innate ideas
回覆刪除人類概念起源和歷史的解釋，Descartes認為有某些概念是innate，但是Locke對此並不贊同，他認為人類出生時並沒有所謂的知識，知識必須依賴經驗獲得。
原文引用自Essay concerning Human Understanding：
By showing that men are born ignorant of everything. This is argued for on the grounds,(1)that there are no proposition, either speculative or practical, which are consciously received as true by every human being at birth; nor(2)even by all in whom reason is developed; (3)that to suppose aught to be innate in the mind, of which that mind is unconscious, involves contradiction (4)that although knowledge, when formed, is found to involve self-evident principles, their self-evidence does not prove (rather disprove)their innateness; and(5)that the hypothesis of their innateness is unnecessary, as the actual steps to knowledge and assent can be proved not to depend on our being born with a consciousness of the meaning and truth of any alleged innate principle. Moreover there could be no innate principles without innate ideas; but our ideas of identity, quantity, substance, and (above all) God, which (if any) must be innate, are plainly dependent on experience. The supposition of innate principle, thus at variance with fact and superfluous, has come into vogue because it ‘eases the lazy from the pains of search,’ and stop inquiry concerning all that us thus accepted, so that it becomes ‘the principle of principle, that innate principles must not be questioned.’
以上是Locke論證時所根據的一些基本想法：
對所有人類來說，無論是推測或是實際的命題，都不可能在出生時就被意識到，也就是說必須依賴於經驗。即使天生論者的論證的理由是合理的，理論本身還是會產生矛盾：如果innate是一出生即存在於心靈，存在心靈就必須被意識到，但是某些人卻無法意識到，例如：嬰兒、野蠻人。雖然某些知識的形成必須包含一些自明的原則，但這些原則並不能證明它們是innate。天生論者對於innate的預設是不必要的，得到知識的真正步驟是不需要依賴於天生及擁有對概念的意識或是所謂的innate principle。此外，Locke認為innate principle無法獨立於innate ideas存在，innate principle所包含的idea必須是innate，基於以上反對innate ideas的理由，支持所有概念必須來自經驗，認為innate principle和事實不符合，是多餘的。
學號:497125023
洛克 同一性
回覆刪除洛克討論同一性時，提到當人是心靈以及肉體所組成，那麼當肉體改變的時候，那個人是不是還是相同的人?而當兩個人有相同的靈魂時，那他們兩個是不是相同的人?而當一個是動物，一個是人類時，擁有相同的靈魂，是否他們是相同的?洛克認為討論人的同一性是沒必要的，因為在人的認知裡並沒有同一性的先天概念。
(引用)"Identity," an idea not innate. If identity (to instance that alone) be a native impression, and consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our cradles, I would gladly be resolved by any one of seven, or seventy years old, whether a man, being a creature consisting of soul and body, be the same man when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages asunder? Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear that our idea of sameness is not so settled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted truths, but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I suppose every one's idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and thousands of his followers have. And which then shall be true? Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?
What makes the same man? Nor let any one think that the questions I have here proposed about the identity of man are bare empty speculations; which, if they were, would be enough to show, that there was in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity. He that shall with a little attention reflect on the resurrection, and consider that divine justice will bring to judgment, at the last day, the very same persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this life, will find it perhaps not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same man, or wherein identity consists; and will not be forward to think he, and every one, even children themselves, have naturally a clear idea of it.(ESSAY concerning HUMAN UNDERSTANDING , Chapter III , p94 , 4 , 5 )
學號:496125037
Locke是一個經驗主義者，因此他反對先驗命題的存在。他認為所有命題都來自於經驗，以下引文他說明，命題不是先驗的，除非命題的ideas是先驗的：
回覆刪除原文引用
An Essay concerning Human Understanding(Chapter III.):
Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the ideas which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the propositions made up of them should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.
Locke認為如果有一些ideas非先驗的，則必然的有一段時間是心裡沒有由這些ideas構成的命題的，因此這些命題就不是先驗的，是來自其他東西的。
Locke主張，一個人對於自己生命的絕對自由權是非常必要的。自由的本質除了法律之外，不受任何外來的力量與權力所控制。
回覆刪除在Civil government一書中，有一段關於奴隸制度的討論（Chapter IV）：
22 This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot by compact or his own consent enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another to take away his life when he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has himself, and he that cannot take away his own life cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in his power, delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service; and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
對於奴隸制度，Locke認為，如果一個人在生活上真的有困難，想去當個奴隸，是可以的，他並沒有打算否定一個人想去作奴隸的自由。但是Locke主張即使一個人身為奴隸，他還是保有基本的自由權，奴隸的主人不可以剝奪這個權利。奴隸有權利選擇自己的生活，奴隸的主人在任何時候都沒有主宰奴隸生死的力量；若奴隸不同意，奴隸的主人也不可擅自轉移奴隸的擁有權。
洛克認為心靈對物體所產生的觀念中，有些與物體的性質（初性 primary quality）相似，有些卻不相似（次性secondary quality）。而能夠產生後面這種觀念的物體性質，他稱之為一種能力(power)。以下便是他說明為何稱這種物體性質為一種能力的原因:
回覆刪除...in the operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with anything in the thing producing it ; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For, through receiving the idea of heat or light from the sun, we are apt to think it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun ; yet when we see wax, or a fair face, receive change of colour from the sun, we cannot imagine that to be the reception or resemblance of anything in the sun, because we find not those different colours in the sun itself. For, our senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power, and not the communication of any quality which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it.
當一物作用於另一物使其性質改變時，可以清楚發現，從後者身上發現的新性質與前者(使之發生的肇因)毫無相似之處，故推測這種新的性質只是某種能力的效果。舉例來說，由於人可以從太陽獲得熱和光的觀念，便使得我們容易認為這些觀念的產生是來自於太陽之中的某些性質，而且觀念本身就是相似於性質。但是當人看見蠟或者白皙的臉被太陽改變了顏色，卻不會認為改變之後的顏色是來自於太陽之中的某些性質，或是說顏色就是相似於那些性質，因為我們知道在太陽裡面找不到這種顏色。
洛克認為，這是由於感官有能力觀察出不同物體的可感性質（次性）間有何相似或不同之處，而在引起可感性質的物體裡面又找不到任何與之相似的可感性質，所以他斷言可感性質的產生是某種力量的效果，而非任何實在性質的傳遞。
洛克反對先天觀念論，是經驗主義者，主張人需要經歷而得到的感覺與經驗才是知識與思想的來源，在此段中洛克以孩童與傻子為例，提出對先天觀念論的質疑與反駁。
回覆刪除An Essay concerning Human Understanding
For, first it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind』s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths: which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? And if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet know, which it was never yet conscious of.
洛克認為以先天觀念論者的主張看來，那麼無論孩童或是傻子也應該擁有某些他們所謂銘刻在心靈上的事物，也就是innate ideas，可是以他們的行為看來似乎是缺少了這些，先天觀念論者的反駁說這是因為innate ideas尚未被心靈察覺到，他們是有能力去做，洛克則質疑這點難以令人理解，如果innate ideas存在於他們心中，應該是容易察覺到的，然而他們卻沒有，因此所謂先天觀念應該是不存在，假若以先天觀念論者的說法來看，則所有ideas皆可以說是原本已經存在於心靈中，尚未被察覺與意識到了嗎？這是洛克的反駁。
洛克在第一章的第五段中，利用透過兒童和白痴的例子來反對天賦原則。以下引用自原文：
回覆刪除5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c. For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown?
洛克認為天賦原則並不是自然地印於人心的。以下形式化其論證：
1.普遍的認同是一切天賦的真理所必需的伴隨條件
2.然而兒童，和白癡等等並不知道任何一條天賦原則
3.因為他們不知道，天賦原則也就欠缺普遍的認同 （universal assent）
4.因此，沒有天賦原則（1、3後項否定）
洛克認為：如果兒童和白癡的靈魂和心理中賦有那些印象，那麼他們就不能不知覺到那些印象，而且必然地會知道這些真理；然而，他們既然沒有知覺到這些印象，那就證明事實上並沒有那些印象。
因為這些印象如果不是自然地印入人心中的意念，則它們如何能說是天賦的 呢？如果它們是自然印入的意念，為什麼人們又不知道它們呢？而這就是問題所在！！
人格同一性是一個相當重要的形上學問題，關於人格同一的判準有多個不同的理論，其中一個理論是以意識的連續做為人格同一的判準，而洛克為此理論的代表人物。洛克將他對人格同一性的想法呈現在 An Essay concerning Human Understanding :
回覆刪除The identity of man. This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in anything else, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued, under one organization of life, in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar Borgia, to be the same man. For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man; and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think nobody, could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus.
1. 肉體連續性:一肉體只要在時空上是有連續性的，就會等同。洛克反駁，胚胎和人在時空上有連續性，但我們卻不會認為胚胎和人是等同的。
2. 靈魂同一:有相同的靈魂就等同。洛克反駁，不同年的身體如何確定有同一個靈魂？又當人的個性轉變，如何確定是同一個靈魂？
洛克認為人格同一性不會在於肉體，也不會在於靈魂，而是在於我們的意識的連續性，也就是說洛克認為，如果人的意識(包括記憶)是連續的，那麼就會是同一個人。
忘了寫
回覆刪除我是洪志豪 哲學三 496125021
我是黃義筌 哲學三 496125027
回覆刪除洛克 與 social contract
回覆刪除在政治方面，洛克孜孜於反對君權神授的觀念，主張社會契約論、天賦人權(自然權)。不同於機械主義的霍布斯、主張公共意志的盧梭，對於社會契約，洛克有著不一樣的看法:
Even though the state of nature is one of peace and harmony,government is still necessary;societies need clear,written,and agreed-upon laws in order to (1)objectively resolve disputes among people;(2)or to enforce the laws fairly,and in a way that will protect the weak and powerless;(3)or to punish wrong-doing in a fair and equitable manner .This creates the need for a social contract,the people agree together to make a contract to form a government for their mutual benefit;they establish a formal agreement or constitution,which is then put into effect by majority vote. In doing so,they transfer some of their individual power and rights to this established political body. Locke's version of the social contract is a form of classical liberalism, which emphasizes strict limits on governmental power, it has several key features, some of which contrast with Hobbes' view:Government is established for the mutual preservation of people's lives, property, and liberties; the authority of the government may not extend beyond what is required for this end;individuals delegate power to government;they do not permanently surrender their power. Ultimate authority rests with the people via majority vote;by this procedure,the community of common citizens has the final right to dissolve or modify the government in any way deemed appropriate. If the government exceeds its proper authority, the social contract is broken and the citizens have aright to revolution, and to replace the government. The established government must rule according to laws and not by arbitrary will. Locke also proposed that government should be divided into 3 branches:(1)executive- which enforces the laws,provides protection for the citizens (directs the police and military). (2)legislative- which establishes new laws, abolishes unnecessary laws.(3)federative- which supervise relations between government and foreign nations; foreign policy. The purpose of this division into 3 branches is to serve to check, balance, and limit the power of each of the other branches.
From:William Lawhead. The Voyage of Discorey:A Historical Introduction to Philosophy.3rd Edition.Wadsworth2007.
洛克對社會契約論的主張，於以下條列式呈現:
1.政府可分為三部分:行政、立法、外交部。
2.若立法部制訂出清晰且具一致性的成文法時，可以解決人民的糾紛、保護弱勢者的權利、以公正的方法處罰做壞事的人。
3.由於法律有保護人民的功能，所以縱然我們處於一個安定、和平的社會中，我們依然需要政府。
4.因此，我們需要建立一個社會契約：人民同意將一部分的自然權交給政府(洛克認為人與生俱來一些權力，將之稱作自然權。包含:生命、財產、自由)，政府因而具備相對的高權力得以促進社會發展。如此，人民與政府基於互相有利而簽訂的的契約稱作社會契約。
5.另外，如果政府超越人民所賦予權力的權限，使得社會契約被破壞，則人民有權革命，建立一個新政府。
1、「我承認另有一個普通觀念，人類有了，會有普通的用處，會出現在普通的談話裡，它就是體的觀念，這觀念我們未曾也不能從感覺或反省得到。」──引自歐康納著、謝啟武譯，《洛克》，遠景事業出版公司，頁70。
回覆刪除2、「我們得到人、馬、金子、水、等等的觀念；對於這些體，我們除了有一些並存在一起的簡單觀念以外，是否有人有更進一步的、清晰的觀念，我〔只好〕訴諸各人自己的經驗。是那在鐵塊或鑽石可以觀察到的普通性質，放在一起，造成那些鐵匠或珠寶匠比哲學家知道得更清楚的體之真正的複雜觀念。」──引自歐康納著、謝啟武譯，《洛克》，遠景事業出版公司，頁71。
3、「一個櫻桃的一切可感覺的性質的觀念經由感覺進入我心；知覺、思維、推論、認知（knowing），等等之觀念則是經由反省而進入我心。這些性質和動作或力量的觀念是被心靈理解為它們自身是跟存在不相一致的……於是心靈知道它們必然與『固著』或『被支持』有關係；『固著』或『被支持』有關係；『固著』或『被支持』是附加到在櫻桃上的紅色或附加到人的思維上去的一個相對觀念，而心靈使支持者這一個〔與被支持者〕相依的觀念（the correlative idea of a support）成形。我從未否認心靈能向它自己形構關係的觀念，在我論關係的篇章裡我所做的剛好是相反」──引自歐康納著、謝啟武譯，《洛克》，遠景事業出版公司，頁71-72。
※
以上這三段話是洛克在講述他對於『體』，也就是『物體』（substance）的理解。
在這裡，洛克提到了『關係』，也就是說：他認為性質和物體之間是有一種關係性聯結的。性質必定得依附於物體之上，它是一種相對的概念。但實際上，我們怎麼能確定『性質必定得依附於物體之上』的這件事？
洛克認為：我們之所以會有『物體』的概念也是基於經驗。舉例來說，我們有了個『紅色』的概念，而『依附』這種關係會邏輯聯結於這個觀念上，但由於『依附』這種關係是需要兩個對象的，因此『物體』的概念便隨之出現。這裡的邏輯聯結關係是來自於Spearman所提出的心理律（psychological）；因此，雖然在洛克的時代裡，心理學並不若現今發達，但洛克的這種推想似乎是可以成立的。
無論如何，洛克所想表達的是：我們無法想像──不論是受限於能力或事實確實如此──性質單獨存在。
當然，即使我們無法想像，也不代表性質的確不能單獨存在。洛克對『性質』必然依附於『物質』的猜想，很可能是基於我們的日常語言。由於我們的名詞、形容詞是區分開來的，這很可能造成我們用語言思考的侷限，進而造成我們認為形容詞（性質）必然得依附於名詞（物質）之上。
洛克是個經驗主義者，他反對理性主義者所持的「innate ideas」觀點，他藉由反對理性主義者主張人們對於上帝的idea是與生俱來的，而且是最早被人類所查覺的innate idea，而說明沒有idea是 innate。
回覆刪除引用原文:
An Essay concerning Human Understanding:
Since then though the knowledge of God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scare any other idea found that can pretend to it. Since if God hath set any impression, any character, on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of Himself; as far as our week capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.
1) 理性主義認為:人類理性最早發現的innate idea是對於上帝的知識。
2) 上帝是人類的創造者，那麼人類對於上帝的知識一定是最清楚且一致的。
3) 但人類對於上帝的idea卻是「難以理解且無限的實體」。
4) 因此，人類對於上帝的idea並非是天生的，其他的idea也不會是天生的，所以idea並非與生俱來便擁有的。
洛克借此論證沒有idea是與生俱來，所有的idea都是由後天的感官經驗學習得來的。
Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain : can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence ? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel : or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being ; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty.
回覆刪除洛克認為我們對於自己存在的這個知識是直覺的，不需要也沒有辦法證明。雖然我們可以懷疑一切東西，但光是有這種懷疑就足以讓我們知覺自己存在，這點是不可懷疑的，因為如果我知道我懷疑，那我一定知道有一個東西在懷疑。在每一種感覺、推理或思考中，我們都能意識到自己的存在。
本以為洛克跟笛卡爾水火不容，沒想到他們對於證明自己存在這方面的觀點這麼相似，上述那段話幾乎是「我思故我在」的推論過程。不過洛克在著作中仍然強調我們會有這樣的知覺是因為我們的”經驗”讓我們相信我們對於自己的存在有一種直覺的知識，跟笛卡爾的觀點還是約略不同。
洛克在政治哲學方面也有卓越的貢獻，探討政府如何而來?首先要探討在政府出現之前我們過著怎麼樣的生活。
回覆刪除引自洛克 政府論 下篇
To understand political power right, and derive it from its original,
we must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature ; without
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal,
no one having more than another ; there being nothing more evident
than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all
the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also
be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection ; unless
the Lord and Master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his
will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
洛克認為自然狀態是一種完全自由、平等、受自然律約束的狀態，表面上這些都是霍布斯的看法，但是洛克對它們有截然不同的解釋，霍布斯的平等是指人類在體力以及智力上差距不大的均等，而洛克的平等則是指每個人生出來都一樣 沒有統治他人的權力，而在自然律上洛克以及霍布斯也有分歧，對洛克而言自然律就是”誰也不應當對另一個人的生命、健康、自由、財產造成損失”，而在自然自由這點上他們兩有著更大的差異，霍布斯的自然自由是指，只要採取保存自己生命有利的行動都是理性的，不應受到道德的約束，就算傷害無辜，但洛克對此有不同的看法，他認為自由並不是放任，在自然狀態下有著自然律讓大家遵守，洛克也同意自然法也需要一個執行者來保護無辜與約束犯罪，因此必須要有一種自然權力，每個人都要擁有，用它來懲罰那些違反自然法的人，每個人都可以去懲罰那些傷害生命、自由或財富的人，而洛克也推論在自然狀態下大自然是豐腴，資源是足夠的，人們並不需要去掠奪，此時就算不用自然懲罰的權力，也可以保持和平的狀態，所以人們很少要去實行懲罰的權力，但是時間的發展土地終究會變的缺乏，因為貨幣的發明，大家就會想種更多的田，換取更多的貨幣囤積，這時搶奪就會發生，自然狀態的缺陷將會越變越大，此時就需要建立公民政府來維持秩序了。
洛克的理論並不是十分完美的，因為過度依賴上帝。洛克的自然律為” 誰也不應當對另一個人的生命、健康、自由、財產造成損失”，背後的原因為”我們都是上帝所創之生靈，是他的財產”，傷害別人不就傷害到上帝的財產了，這是非常恐怖的事情，而後洛克沒有清楚的解釋人類有何動機去遵守自然律，對洛克而言，自然律是上帝創造的，而上帝不會去做無用的事情。以上就是洛克對上帝的依賴。
Locke反對有innate ideas，他認為一個idea不會憑空出現在那，而是要透過我們去經驗才能夠獲得。
回覆刪除引用：
For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs to be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.
If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing.
No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. (Essay Concerning Human Understanding p.40, 5)
innatists認為我們的idea是與生俱來的，並且idea分成兩種，分別是simple ideas和complex ideas，而cpmplex ideas又是由直接經驗得到的simple ideas組合得來的。但是反駁提到，像是嬰兒、智障者等，他們並沒有ideas，那這麼一來，就可以說我們一開始並沒有innate ideas。而innatists雖然回應，嬰兒和智障者等，不是沒有innate ideas，而是因為沒有查覺到潛藏在心中的innate ideas，但他們的心靈天生其實是有能力去理解的。但是那些我們有能力去理解的命題，又怎麼能證明他確實是innate ideas?這點是Locke質疑的。
洛克在政治哲學方面主張社會契約論、天賦人權。在國家形式的選擇方面表達了以下的看法
回覆刪除引用自Two Treatises on Government/ John Locke BOOK II, CHAPTER 10
Of the Forms of a Commonwealth
THE majority having, as has been showed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing, and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy; or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors, and then it is an oligarchy; or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy; if to him and his heirs, it is a hereditary monarchy; if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor, to return to them, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again, when it is so reverted the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government; for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth.
洛克認為制定法律的權歸誰這一點就決定國家的形式。當人們最初聯合成為社會的時候，既然大多數人自然擁有屬於共同體的全部權力，他們就可以隨時運用全部權力來為社會制定法律，通過他們自己委派的官史來執行那些法律，因此這種政府形式就是純粹的民主政治；或者，把制定法律的權力交給少數精選的人和他們的嗣子或繼承人，那麼就是寡頭政治；如果把權力交給一個人，那麼就是君主政治；如果交給他和他的嗣子，這就是世襲君主制；如果只是交給他終身，在他死後，推定後繼者的權力仍歸於大多數人，這就是選任君主制。因此，依照這些型式，共同體可以就他們認為適當的，建立複合的混合的政府形式。
495125022 孫孟茹
回覆刪除洛克主張：沒有簡單觀念，我們就無法形成複雜觀念；若我們沒有感官經驗的話，就無法形成知識而我們的感官經驗，源自於簡單觀念。但洛克的該主張仍存在著問題，進一步討論到初性與次性原則。
引用Contents of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II -- Ideas, xii. Complex ideas,第一段：
So far we have considered only Ÿideas that the mind receives passively, namely Ÿthe simple ones that come to it from sensation and reflection. The mind can’t make any such simple idea for itself, and can’t have any idea that doesn’t wholly consist of them. But while the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, it acts in various ways to construct other ideas out of its simple ones, which are the materials and foundations of all the rest. The acts in which the mind exerts its power over its simple ideas are chiefly these three: (1) Combining several simple ideas into one compound one; that is how all complex ideas are made. (2) Bringing together two
ideas, whether simple or complex, setting them side by side so as to see them both at once, without uniting them into one; this is how the mind gets all its ideas of relations. (3) Separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called abstraction, and it is how all the mind’s general ideas are made.
This shows that the power a man has, and his exercise of it, are pretty much the same in the intellectual world as in the material one. In neither realm has he any power to make or destroy any raw materials; all he can do is either to Ÿunite them together, or Ÿset them side by side, or Ÿwholly separate them. (·For example, he cannot make or destroy rocks, but he can assemble them to make a wall, or dismantle a wall that has been made from them·.) I shall begin with uniting, and shall come to the other two in due course.
As simple ideas are observed to exist in various combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea; not only in combinations that exist in external objects, but also in ones the mind makes up. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones I call complex. Examples are ·the ideas of· beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe. These are all complex ideas made up of simple ones, but the mind can if it wishes treat each of them by itself as one unified thing, signified by one name.
人們在心裡對於簡單觀念的作用大約有三種：1.將幾個簡單觀念結合成一個複雜觀念。2.將兩個簡單觀念並列觀察，並得到一種關係的複雜觀念。3.將某些觀念排除於主要觀念之外，以抽象作用形成一個概括的概念。
簡單觀念是藉由感官經驗或是內省而來，大約有四種來源：1.感官經驗所感覺到的視覺、觸覺、聽覺等等。2.兩種感官經驗交互而來，例如空間、形狀等，由視覺、觸覺交互作用產生。3.內省經驗，如記憶、判斷等等內在心靈的作用。4.感覺與反省交互而來，例如快樂、悲傷等情緒。
從上面敘述可以了解，洛克想表達的是一種心靈運作過程中由簡到繁的關係，但是實際上可能會面臨的問題是，實際上，我們對於感官經驗這種簡單觀念可能是複雜不明的，我們可能是藉由學習或判斷的過程中去理解顏色或觸覺等等，這是否就是一種反省的經驗，而非感官經驗？
這些問題，我們可以從初性或次性的性質去解讀。
初性是該物體本身便具有的性質，例如形狀、大小。而次性則是依賴在我們感官經驗上的，例如顏色、聲音、香氣等等。
Locke on Reason and faith
回覆刪除對於理性與信仰的看法，Locke主張人類的理性應判斷宗教啟示、神喻的真假，且如果宗教啟示與理性矛盾(即為假)，則我們應當拒絕相信此宗教啟示。
24. Reason and Faith not opposite, for Faith must be regulated by Reason.
There is another use of the word REASON, wherein it is OPPOSED TO FAITH: which, though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet common use has so authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to
it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and places it as he should, who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that doth otherwise, transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter. (An essay concerning human understanding. Book IV Ch.XVII. Section 24)
此處，Locke認為理性先於信仰，信仰應受理性所控制。理性是上帝給予人類的能力，我們應該以理性作為事物判准的依歸，相信理性告訴我們應該去相信的、對理性無法解釋的事物存疑。信仰(a firm assent of the mind)只有在堅定的理性作為基礎時，才是信仰，理性是證成信仰的理由。沒有理性證成的信仰就如同個人的想像，沒有真實可言。
495125050 李明原
回覆刪除Locke是標準的英國經驗主義者，他對於Descartes所提出的innate ideas並不認同。Locke認為所有的知識都是從經驗中所獲得的，沒有人在一生下來就具有先天知識。以最簡單的例子來說，Locke提出了在語言的學習上，一個嬰兒從開始會說話到有完整的文法結構，並不是取決於他/她的血統或天生賦予的(innate principle)，環境才會是主要影響一個人學習語言的最大要件(後天經驗)
引用原文：For, first it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind』s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths: which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? And if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet know, which it was never yet conscious of.
Locke也藉由反對innate ideas提出對上帝的質疑，並且批評宗教式學術的腐敗。
洛克對於人類是否能有充分的方法
回覆刪除來獲得關於真理的確定知識提出了以下的方法
引用原文)First,I shall inquire into the original
of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please
to call them, which a man observes, and is concious to
himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding
comes to be furnished with them.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding
hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith
or opinion: whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition
as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. And here we shall
have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.
首先，要研究人所觀察到的，在心中所意識到的那些觀念或意念(可以隨便命名)，都
有什麼根源；並且要研究，理解是由什麼方式得到那些觀念。
第二，要努力指出，藉理解那些觀念有什麼知識，並且要指出那種知識的明確度、證明
和範圍。
第三，要研究信仰或意見的本質和根據，在這裡指的意見是我們尚未確知其為真的那些
命題認以為真的同意而言。這裡還需要考究同意的根據和程度。
洛克反對理性主義對於我們有先天觀念的主張。首先他認為普遍的同意這一點不能做為支持理性主義的證據。因為我們對同樣的一件事情產生相同的看法並不一定是天生，而也可能是因為經歷過相同或是類似的經驗。
回覆刪除而且人並非能夠真的可以普遍同意真理。如一物不能是自身又非它自身。這是一個大家認為只要運用理性就可以輕易了解的真理。但是洛克說明，此真理不能為孩童和智能障礙者所理解。而這樣也就表示在資源、經驗、自身條件不同的情況下，人不會普遍同意某事。
而且若說普遍同意是一出生即刻印在人心靈中的符號，需要被啟發才能理解，這樣的說法沒道理，也不足以證明先天觀念。 嬰兒數數，在嬰兒尚未得到"相等"及其他的觀念時，他不知道"４＋３＝７"。一旦他明白甚麼是相等，他便會立刻同意該命題。而人無法同意該命題，不是因為人不會運用理性能力。
人們是先學會名詞才知道名詞的意義的，而且名詞和意義都不是與生俱來的，因此在我們同意它們時，必須看它們是否與我們的觀念契合。
引自No Innate Speculative Principles
Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c. For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words "to be in the understanding" have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, "Whatsoever is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.